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CONSIDERING CONVERGENCE: A
POLICY DIALOGUE ABOUT
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS,
NEUROSCIENCE, AND LAW
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I
INTRODUCTION
As the poet Mark Strand said, “The future is always beginning now.”1
When considering the social impact that neuroscience and behavioral genetics
will have on the criminal justice system, scientists, lawyers, courts, and
policymakers might do well to keep Strand’s words in mind. Too often it is
assumed that for developments in science and technology, there is time to start
the policy dialogue in “the future.” Those who would address the issues later
typically assert that the science in question is too immature, that it is too early,
that the discussion is too speculative. While such objections sometimes have
merit, it seems society is most often too slow in promoting a public dialogue.
Open public dialogue is an important tool in considering and weighing
public reaction, in informing the public and policymakers, and in building public
consensus about appropriate and responsible uses of science and technology.
Scientific advancements can result in strong, negative public reactions, as with
nuclear power in the United States, genetically modified food crops in the
European Union, and human research cloning in a variety of nations. This
negative backlash can in turn influence scientists and science policy and slow
the progress of socially valuable research. When the social risks are great, it
may be prudent to slow the pace of research. However, when the risks are
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minimal, and the negative reaction is based on incomplete or inaccurate
information about the science, then restraints on research serve little purpose.
Now is the time to call on scientists, lawyers, courts, and lawmakers to begin
a sustained dialogue focused on the impact that scientific discoveries and
technological advances might have on the criminal law. The dialogue should
focus on developing appropriate policies to address the legal and social issues
raised by such advances. Such a dialogue is necessary, in particular, concerning
the focus of this essay: the impact of neuroscience and behavioral genetics on
criminal law.
This article first briefly considers some of the commonalities and differences
between behavioral genetics and neuroscience as they relate to the criminal law,
including topics addressed by both fields, as well as how each field might be
applied in criminal proceedings. The article then focuses on a common concern
raised by both fields in this context—the possible misuse of science in the
criminal law. It concludes with a proposal to address the need for a continuing
policy dialogue about the law and scientific developments in neuroscience and
behavioral genetics.
II
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)2 has
sought to advance the public and policy dialogues in both behavioral genetics
and neuroscience in the past few years.3 It is reasonable to ask why anyone
would consider the effect on the criminal law of two broad scientific fields,
rather than deal with each separately. It seems increasingly clear, though, that
when describing, predicting, and understanding human behavior, numerous
scientific discussions may be considered part of one larger discussion; various
scientific fields converge in their exploration and explanation of human actions.
It makes some scientific sense to talk about neuroscience and behavioral
genetics together; indeed, the disciplines overlap and interact—for example, a
person’s genes affect how his brain develops.4 It similarly makes legal sense to

2. AAAS is a non-profit, non-governmental organization located in Washington, D.C. It is the
largest general scientific organization in the world and publisher of the journal SCIENCE. According to
its website, “AAAS serves some 262 affiliated societies and academies of science, serving 10 million
individuals.” About AAAS, http://www.aaas.org/aboutaaas. AAAS is “open to all and fulfills its
mission to ‘advance science and serve society’ through initiatives in science policy; international
programs; science education; and more.” Id.
3. For more information, please see the website for the Scientific Freedom, Responsibility & Law
Program, http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/about/mission.shtml. Of particular relevance are the Behavioral
Genetics Project site, http://www.aaas.org/spp/bgenes, and the Neuroscience and the Law site,
http://www.aaas.org/spp/sfrl/projects/neuroscience. Project publications are available for free download
at both sites.
4. Another example of this overlap can be found in the emergence of a new, complex behavioral
biology—one that will ultimately be not only descriptive but predictive. See Owen D. Jones & Timothy
H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005). Many scientific
disciplines will contribute to the knowledge base that will underlie such a biology.
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consider a larger behavioral biology, and it makes sense to consider the two
fields together from a policy perspective. Moreover, public dialogues at AAAS
and elsewhere on behavioral genetics and neuroscience suggest that both
disciplines are ripe for further discussion about their nexus with criminal law
and policy.
III
COMMON ISSUES OF INTEREST
Behavioral genetics and neuroscience converge on a number of scientific,
legal, social, and ethical issues—in particular, on two areas of interest to the
criminal justice system: the prediction of behavior and the use of behavioral
information in the preliminary stages of criminal processes.
A. Prediction of Behavior: Mitigation
Both neuroscience and behavioral genetics have focused considerably on
explaining and predicting behavior.5 Much discussion has focused on “ultimate”
issues such as free will, determinism (genetic or mechanistic), and their effect on
whether the concept of criminal culpability will be undone by new scientific
discoveries. This seems unlikely, at least in the near future.6 A more intriguing
and immediate concern is how scientific findings will affect the criminal law
regarding the mitigation of criminal responsibility. For example, neuroscience
and behavioral genetics seem particularly likely to play a role in addressing
drug addiction; findings in both fields may be relevant to how society chooses to

5. Courts and prosecutors currently use prediction constantly—in plea bargaining, sentencing,
decisions about levels of probation, and case diversion, among other proceedings. As the parties
involved seek to weigh future risks, including the likelihood of recidivism, they do so knowing that our
predictive models and abilities are really very poor. To the extent that neuroscience and behavioral
genetics can better inform such predictions, the courts and criminal justice system could stand to
benefit significantly.
The risk, of course, is that predictive decisions will be based on poor or incomplete science.
Additionally, neuroscience-based or genetics-based predictions may be given undue weight as
“scientific predictions” while still prone to the problems inherent in current risk prediction models,
including construction bias in the normative or sample groups and the inability of predictive measures
to provide information about any specific individual beyond probabilistic information about a group to
which the subject belongs.
The pressing need for courts to make decisions about sentencing and risk management increases the
risk for early adoption of immature “predictive models.” The courts are in a difficult place with
prediction—they cannot wait for the next round of peer-reviewed research results. See generally Erica
Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting Violent Behavior in a
Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003) (discussing this challenge, particularly that
juries should get both predictive information as well as details as to the limitations of such information).
6. Nor, indeed, will it be undone in the long term. As Stephen Morse has argued in the context of
neuroscience, the idea of criminal responsibility is not an artifact of science, but, like law itself, a human
construct that is mind-dependent; since we are constrained by our view of ourselves as rational agents,
our constructs will reflect these views. This is admittedly a gross simplification of Morse’s argument.
See Steven J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN,
MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157 (Brent Garland ed., 2004).
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handle criminal behavior that accompanies addiction, such as drug possession.7
Neuroscience has shown that the brains of addicts are different from those of
non-addicts,8 and there appears to be a genetic predisposition towards
addiction.9 As with criminal behavior generally, the question arises whether
such information (neuroscientific or genetic) should mitigate criminal
responsibility, at least when there is evidence of neurological or genetic
differences in the accused.
Neuroscience adds a gloss to this question by providing highly effective
pharmaceutical treatments for opiate addiction that are currently available and
yet not widely in use.10 One drug, naltrexone, serves to block the pleasurable or
rewarding effect of the opiates by blocking the receptors to which the opiates
bind, preventing their euphoric effects.11 As long as the individual is compliant
in taking naltrexone, relapse, in the sense of experiencing the pleasurable
aspects of opiate use, is impossible. Successful drug treatment not only reduces
the health risks associated with drug use, but also eliminates the legal risk of
incarceration for possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia. Drug addicts
could, in theory, be diverted to a mandatory treatment program at a much
lower cost than incarceration. Thus, by changing the way that society views and
understands addiction, drug use, and treatment, neuroscience has the potential
to reshape our policies on criminalization and incarceration as they pertain to
drug-related offenses.
Indeed, mitigation is the most obvious issue that the scientific, legal, and
policy communities must face with some immediacy. This need was highlighted
most recently by the Supreme Court decision in Roper v. Simmons, which
barred capital punishment for juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen.12
The opinion referred to “the scientific and sociological studies”13 cited by the
respondent and amici as confirming a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility” found in the young.14 Several amici briefs15 cite brain
7. The potential upside for better understanding addiction is important since treating addiction is
viewed by many as a long-term, if not lifelong, process. The relapse rate is high, and the legal penalties
for illegal drug use are substantial.
8. See, e.g., Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45 (1997);
Nora D. Volkow, Beyond the Brain: The Medical Consequences of Abuse and Addiction, NIDA NOTES,
Feb. 2004, at 3.
9. For a brief review article, see Eric J. Nestler, Genes and Addiction, 26 NATURE GENETICS 277
(2000).
10. Neuroscience can offer a brain-based treatment in a way that behavioral genetics cannot—that
is, behavioral genetics is unlikely to offer a form of gene therapy for addiction anytime soon. See, for
example, Charles P. O’Brien, A Range of Research-Based Pharmacotherapies for Addiction, 278
SCIENCE 66 (1997).
11. For a brief overview of these treatments, see Christian A. Heidbreder & Jim J. Hagan, Novel
Pharmacotherapeutic Approaches for the Treatment of Drug Addiction and Craving, 5 CURRENT
OPINION IN PHARMACOLOGY 107 (2005). Opiates are not the only drugs for which new treatments are
being developed. For example, one vaccine, TA-CD, reduces the euphoric effects of cocaine. Cocaine
Vaccine Trials Progress, BBC NEWS, Apr. 2, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/1906823.stm.
12. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
13. Id. at 1195.
14. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
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studies as offering evidence of immaturity and lack of judgment sufficient to
mitigate a juvenile’s culpability, even when the juvenile engages in the worst
behavior—behavior for which society reserves the death penalty.16
In comparison, the well-known Brunner study of a Dutch family in the
1990s17 helped raise a similar question regarding whether behavioral genetics
should be considered in mitigation. The study discovered a very rare defect in
the gene encoding for monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), an enzyme that helps
break down certain neurotransmitters.18 The defect appeared to correlate with
antisocial behavior,19 which raised the obvious question of how such a finding
might be used in arguing for mitigation in criminal cases.
Shortly after the research was published, defense counsel in a death penalty
case filed a motion seeking funds to determine whether their client suffered
from a deficiency of enzymatic activity for MAOA, with a request for follow-up
genetic testing as well.20 The trial court denied the defense request, “finding
that the theory behind the request for funds will not have reached a scientific
stage of verifiable certainty in the near future and that [the defendant] could
not show that such a stage will ever be reached.”21
Although the court was correct in rejecting the science as premature,
research continues on the correlation between MAOA and antisocial behavior.
Subsequent research published in 2002 suggests that children with low MAOA
expression who are maltreated may be at a greater risk for antisocial behavior,22
though a more recent study failed to replicate those findings.23 Similar MAOA
challenges are likely in the future as the literature evolves.
Even if MAOA challenges or other arguments based on behavioral genetics
are accepted by courts in the future, it is not always clear which way scientific

15. See Juvenile Death Penalty Amicus Briefs, http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/simmons/
simmonsamicus.html (last visited May 24, 2005).
16. Although the Court did not directly cite any specific amicus brief, several amici supporting the
respondent cited neuroscientific support for their position. Although none could conclude that the
neuroscience was controlling in the Court’s decision in Roper, it is reasonable to expect that lawyers
will be citing to neuroscience developments in the future. For example, the amicus brief filed by the
American Psychological Association and the Missouri Psychological Association argued that
neuropsychological research suggests that the adolescent brain is not as developed as the mature adult’s
brain; similarly, the brief filed by the American Medical Association made a similar “immature brain”
argument. See id.
17. H.G. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated With a Point Mutation in the Structural
Gene for Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 SCIENCE 578 (1993).
18. Id. at 579.
19. Id.
20. Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65 (Ga. 1995). See also Deborah W. Denno, Legal Implications
of Genetics and Crime Research, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 248, 251–53
(Gregory R. Bock & Jamie A. Goode eds., 1996).
21. Mobley, 455 S.E.2d at 66.
22. Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297
SCIENCE 851 (2002).
23. Brett C. Haberstick et al., Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) and Antisocial Behaviors in the
Presence of Childhood and Adolescent Maltreatment, 135 AM. J. MED. GENETICS (PART B:
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC GENETICS) 59 (2005).
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knowledge will cut when introduced at trial. For example, while a defendant
could argue for mitigation due to some genetic propensity or neurological
defect (“bad genes” or a “bad brain” led him astray), the prosecution could
make a counterargument for aggravation, saying that the defendant is even
more dangerous because he is biologically predisposed to commit crime and
thus should be incarcerated rather than given probation. This mirror side to
mitigation arguments should also be included in the policy dialogue.
B. Preformal Uses
Neuroscience and behavioral genetics converge on issues other than
mitigation related to how and when to use possibly relevant findings from these
sciences:
[A significant fear], both in the behavioral genetics area and with [neuroscience], is
that there are no [rules of evidence] that control the use of these kinds of technologies
in the preformal stages of criminal processes. When it gets to the formality of
sentencing, the cry will come up, but the ability of judges and prosecutors to make
decisions about whether they’re going to initiate charges, [whether] they’re going to
accept diversion [from criminal prosecution] for people, et cetera—using
[neuroscience tests] that haven’t been validated—is a serious risk that the technology
24
poses.

Such concerns offer a good example of a policy question that also needs to be
addressed in the near future: how neuroscience and behavioral genetics
findings might be used by the legal system in “preformal” settings—that is, prior
to bringing criminal charges. For example, defense counsel could bring test
results to prosecutors as part of a precharging dialogue, seeking dismissal,
reduction of charges, or some other outcome.25 Such usages would essentially
be unreviewable and possibly nonpublic. In addition, such information could be
considered without even the minimal protections offered by the Daubert26 or
Frye27 tests regarding admissibility in formal proceedings.28 Although the exact

24. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 38 (quoting neuroscientist participant).
25. To give the prosecution their fair share of concern, district attorneys could seek genetic or
neuroscientific information in deciding to bring charges, or use it in arguments to a grand jury to secure
an indictment.
26. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), superseded by statute,
FED. R. EVID. 702.
27. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. The admissibility of scientific information into evidence at trial is generally governed by two
approaches:
(1) The Frye standard allows for the admission of scientific evidence when the scientific technique,
data, or method is generally accepted by the scientific community in the relevant field. 293 F. at 1014.
The courts relied on the members of the relevant scientific discipline for the standard, with “general
acceptance” usually being proven through additional expert testimony, the citing of standard reference
materials in the discipline, and various other methods. Id.
(2) The newer approach, and the one now codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, is the Daubert
standard, which offers four criteria for courts to use in their evaluations: (a) falsifiability, which asks if
the theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (b) subjection of the theory or technique to peer
review; (c) the known or potential error rate of the methodology or technique; and (d) a Frye-like
general acceptance criteria. 509 U.S. at 592–95. The four elements form a flexible rule, one whose
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nature of these preformal usages is unclear, it seems prudent for policymakers,
lawyers, and scientists to consider how such uses might be addressed in ways
that are socially, legally, and scientifically appropriate.
IV
INSTRUCTIVE DIFFERENCES
Both genetics and neuroscience raise many of the same policy questions
when it comes to issues such as the prediction of behavior, but there are
obviously areas in which the fields differ. Nevertheless, even when there are
differences, the policy dialogue can be enriched by considering the two fields
together. The dialogue that has already begun about genetics may serve to
inform and shape the way society thinks about neuroscience, and neuroscience
may have some lessons for behavioral genetics as well. For example, genetics in
general garnered a fair amount of early attention from the public and
policymakers. As the human genome project advanced, lawmakers in several
states enacted laws to protect genetic information and to guard against
potentially discriminatory uses.29 This was an unusual and entirely proactive
approach to policymaking, as there had generally been no litigation about
genetic discrimination at that point. The mere specter of risk of misuse of
genetic information had caused lawmakers to act.
Yet no such actions have been spurred on by recent developments in
neuroscience. The link between brain and behavior is much closer than the link
between genes and behavior, but the attention to genetics research and its
broad social implications has far outweighed that given to neuroscience and
technology.30
Neuroscience could likely benefit from the same public
consideration and policy dialogue.
A. Essentialism and Exceptionalism
The potential impact of genetic “exceptionalism”31 and genetic
“essentialism”32 is an area in which the policy dialogue in genetics has outpaced
focus should be on determining scientific validity, meaning the evidentiary relevance and reliability. Id.
at 594–95.
29. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.345 (2005) (forbidding the use of genetic testing for employment).
Although the U.S. Congress has yet to pass comprehensive legislation to prevent genetic
discrimination, bills have been proposed several times. For example, in 2003, the Senate passed the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, but the bill failed to pass the House. S. 1053, 108th Cong.
(2004). The Senate has passed the bill again in the current Congress. Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, S. 306, 109th Cong. (2005). See also Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of
Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 669 (2001)
(providing a brief overview and analysis of some state genetic information laws).
30. See Open Your Mind, THE ECONOMIST, May 23, 2002, at 79 (discussing the legal implications
of neuroscientific research).
31. In genetics, a concern has arisen that passing laws and special rules for genetic discrimination
(rather than treating such matters under current anti-discrimination schemes, like the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)), will result in a perception by the public that genetic
factors are more important and determinative of our well-being and behavior than they actually are.
This singling out of genetic information for special protection seems to indicate an exceptionally
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the dialogue in neuroscience and in which the thinking on genetics has been
especially instructive. Both exceptionalism and essentialism deal with the idea
that the public may perceive scientific information about a person as being
more powerfully determinative than it in fact is.
For genetics, these constructs seem to have worked well in guiding
discussion and in thinking about appropriate policy. However, the essentialism
argument may not be as obvious in neuroscience as it is in genetic science.33
People may see their brains as being much more “who they are” than their
genes, and they may accordingly offer less resistance to using neuroscientific
information in criminal and other court proceedings. This aspect of brain
science may not have even been considered as potentially problematic, had it
not been for the genetics policy debates.
B. Truth-telling
Neuroscience may have something instructive to offer behavioral genetics in
the field of truth-telling,34 since it is more likely than behavioral genetics to
develop techniques to tell when someone is lying. The development of accurate
and reliable neuroscience-based lie detection is already being vigorously
explored by researchers, and this has obvious value to the law.35 If such

powerful amount or type of knowledge—hence, genetic exceptionalism. A similar concern would arise
regarding neuroscientific information.
32. Essentialism is the idea that the person is reducible to some limited element of their biology,
that is, “I am my genes” or “I am my brain.”
33. As Stanford law professor Henry Greely observed in the AAAS neuroscience and law meeting,
“It seems to be quite possible that I am my mind or I am my brain in a way that I’m quite clear I am not
my genes. My genes are not me. My mind, my brain, well, maybe that is me.” NEUROSCIENCE AND
THE LAW, supra note 6, at 34 (quoting Greely).
34. Lie detection tests have frequently been held to be inadmissible, in part due to concerns about
the accuracy and reliability of techniques such as the polygraph. E.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523
U.S. 303, 309–12 (1998). For the types of questions discussed in the body of this paper, it is assumed
that neuroscience is likely to eventually produce substantially more accurate and reliable testing in
order for it to be admissible and relevant.
For a more in-depth discussion of some legal implications of neuroscience-based lie detection,
see Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal and Social
Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 114.
Greely notes several bases for excluding lie detection tests from court proceedings, including accuracy
concerns and invasion of the purview of the jury in their role as finder of fact. Id. See also Laurence R.
Tancredi, Neuroscience Developments and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at
71.
35. This is an area of strong research interest and is becoming increasingly sophisticated. For
example, one of the most significant hurdles facing accurate lie detection is what could be termed “the
problem of unintentional deceit.” Although techniques might be developed to detect when someone is
intentionally lying, there might be real difficulty in detecting when someone is merely mistaken—that
is, when they are engaging in unintentional deceit, subjectively telling the truth but being factually in the
wrong. See Paul Root Wolpe, et al., Emerging Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection: Promises and
Perils, 5(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 (2005) (detailing some of the overall problems associated with lie
detector technology). Yet, even this difficult problem seems to be gradually yielding to researchers.
See Scott D. Slotnick & Daniel L. Schacter, A Sensory Signature that Distinguishes True from False
Memories, 7 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 664 (2004); Daniel L. Schacter & Scott D. Slotnick, The
Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory Distortion, 44 NEURON 149 (2004), available at
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/%7Eslotnick/articles/slotnick04_nat_neurosci_supp.pdf.
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technology were to be successfully developed, lie detection could be used to
evaluate the testimony of witnesses and defendants, to challenge jurors’
responses in voir dire, or to poll the jury following a verdict. Courts would have
to determine whether witnesses or defendants could be compelled to be tested
for truthfulness and whether the judge or jury should be allowed to consider the
refusal of a witness to take such a test. All of these would be just the tip of the
iceberg.
Issues surrounding the acceptability and legality of compelled neurosciencebased testing, including court decisions regarding when and how to use lie
detection technology, would likely be instructive for any behavioral genetics
tests that develop (such as one to determine a propensity for impulsive violence
for use in either mitigation or evaluations of future risk).
V
A SHARED HISTORY
Just as both fields share common areas of interest and application, they
share a common problem—the problem of history. The history of the criminal
law and science is one that makes people cautious. Prior uses of science to
underpin law by politicians and policymakers include examples in which
developing science was misused, and sometimes exploited, occasionally to
brutal ends.36 Because of this history, any attempt to understand criminality
from the basis of biology will suffer from suspicion and doubt, and many will
have concerns that any such research findings or technologies will be used in
oppressive and reactionary ways. These public concerns about the possible
abuse of science push just as strongly for a broad policy dialogue as do the
hopes for valuable uses.37 One might call this “the curse of Lombroso”38—the
haunting risk that immature science could be adopted and used for political and
social purposes that feed into the worst of human behavior.
History provides several examples of misguided efforts to apply science to
the study of criminality and to use such findings to make policy and law. By

36. See, e.g., NICOLE HAHN RAFTER, CREATING BORN CRIMINALS (1997) (offering an overview
of biological theories of criminality from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); Paul A. Lombardo,
Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medicine: Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three
Generations of ??? Are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191 (2003) (considering contemporary genetic
science in the context of the history of eugenics in America).
37. The potential for discriminatory or eugenic uses of modern genetics research is a good example
of a modern public concern. See Garland E. Allen, Is a New Eugenics Afoot?, 294 SCIENCE 59 (2001)
(providing a historical overview of the development of the eugenics movement). See also Paul A.
Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to Reproductive
Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (1996) (discussing how the eugenics laws continue to
play a role in our modern legal thinking).
38. Cesare Lombroso was a nineteenth-century Italian physician who developed the idea that
criminals could be detected scientifically through anthropomorphic measurements. Lombroso put
forth the idea of the “born” criminal; while his theories were disproven, other concepts of the “born”
criminal (or of innate criminality) would continue to play a dangerous role well into the twentieth
century, including through the American eugenics movement.
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now the examples are familiar—from Lombroso’s work in the 1800s to identify
criminals by anthropomorphic measurements, to the hereditarian theories of
some phrenologists, to the development of degeneration theory in the early
twentieth century.39 Perhaps the most horrible American example of science
being misused in policy and the law was the development of eugenic
sterilization laws in the 1920s and 1930s—laws that sought to forcibly sterilize
the “feeble-minded,” spurred at least in part by the intent to eliminate
“inherited criminality.” Anyone with any interest in this topic remembers the
chilling words of Justice Holmes in Buck v. Bell, “Three generations of
imbeciles are enough.”40 Perhaps the coldest chill, however, comes from the
sentences preceding that famous line:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
41
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.

The Supreme Court upheld the compulsory eugenic sterilization laws of
Virginia, other states took them as a model, and many people were forcibly
sterilized under these laws.
Although the history of American eugenics may be one of the most
inflammatory examples of science being misused to make bad law and bad
policy, not every time science and the criminal law meet means a disaster in the
offing. The law is not always easily swayed by attempts to use bad or immature
science. For example, during the 1960s a theory emerged regarding males who
possessed an additional Y-chromosome.42 These so-called “XYY males” were
thought to be particularly aggressive and inclined to violence and criminality.43
In general, courts rejected attempts to admit such information.44 The impact on
the law, such as it was, was rather mild, and eventually, the concept of the XYY
male as someone who posed a high risk for criminal behavior was discredited.45
What the eugenics experiment and the XYY theory have in common is the
extent to which developing science was seized upon and used by nonscientists—
policymakers, politicians, judges, and lawyers—who sought to dress their
agendas in the trappings of legitimate scientific debate. In part, the ability to
misuse science (and for lawyers to ineffectively combat such misuse) comes
from the different approaches of the two cultures. Science has a narrowing,
problem-focused method, and its discoveries are seen as part of a continuing
dialogue, open to change in light of new information. The timeline is long, the
knowledge slowly built up, but the entire system is open to complete
39. See generally RAFTER, supra note 36, (detailing a history of these examples).
40. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
41. Id.
42. Deborah W. Denno, Comment, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free
Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 619–20 (1988).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 620.
45. See id. at 622.
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upheaval—hypotheses, after all, prompt disproof as well as proof. Science
values consensus and replicability.
Lawyers and judges, on the other hand, often operate with little knowledge
of science and the scientific method and work on a more pressing timeline to
solve the problems immediately before them. Law moves forward on
advocacy—using the tools available at the time the conflict must be addressed.
Policymakers add a third approach to the mix—one driven by political
concerns and marginally limited in what issues can be considered in formulating
positions. Lawyers and scientists are somewhat constrained by the rules of law
and peer review, respectively. Policymakers, on the other hand, have broad,
wide-sweeping powers and can seize on and implement policies with farreaching impacts that, once in place, can be quite difficult to revise.
VI
CONCLUSION
The potential impact of neuroscience and behavioral genetics on the
criminal law, the extent to which the fields converge on common areas, the
history of science and the criminal law, and the potential for policymakers to
seize on early findings for political goals all lead to this conclusion: The time
for a deep, broad, science-driven policy discussion is now. Both neuroscience
and behavioral genetics sit at the courtroom door.46 The issues at the forefront
are not the more academic and philosophical ones of causation, free will,
determinism, and responsibility, but rather those posed by technologies that are
poised to come into courtroom and preformal use soon. These technologies will
lay the legal foundations for how courts think about and utilize these
developing sciences, possibly for years to come.47

46. In fact, neuroscience has already entered the courtroom for a visit. See Roper v. Simmons, 125
S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (forbidding the death penalty for juvenile offenders in light of their ongoing
psychological and emotional development).
47. Oftentimes, the fear is that weak or immature science will be accepted into evidence by a court,
to be followed by a flood of decisions influenced by bad science. There are other possible negative
effects as well, including when the introduction of science seen as weak or immature results in a ban on
all such evidence. For example, in Virginia, a line of cases bars any and all testimony regarding a
defendant’s mental state, unless an insanity defense is being asserted:
The state of knowledge in the fields of medicine and psychiatry is subject to constant advance
and change. The classifications and gradations applied to mental illnesses, disorders, and
defects are frequently revised. The courts cannot, and should not, become dependent upon
these subtle and shifting gradations for the resolution of each specific case.
Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985) (citing Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463
(1946), and Wahrlich v. Arizona, 479 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1973)). The level of scientific proof and
relevance needed to reverse the ruling in Stamper remains unclear. In the interim, the evidentiary bar
would appear to preclude any and all testimony about mental state, be it psychiatric, psychological,
medical, or neurological. This bar has precluded testimony regarding the mental capacity of a
defendant in a malicious wounding case in which the defendant, who had an established history of
mental retardation and an estimated IQ of 65, shook and injured his infant son. Funk v.
Commonwealth, No. 1821-02-4, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 383 (2003). See also Peeples v. Commonwealth,
519 S.E.2d 382, 386 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding the exclusion of expert testimony from psychologist
in aggravated malicious wounding case, where defense sought to admit evidence to rebut assumption of
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Members of the scientific, legal, and criminal justice professions should join
forces to advise and inform policymakers and the public on the scientific, legal,
and social issues associated with advances in neuroscience and behavioral
genetics. This effort should strive to engage policymakers to make better, more
fully informed decisions about science, the criminal law, and policy—decisions
that would hopefully reduce the risks of the following: unwarranted backlash to
developments in science and technology, poorly informed legislation, and
judicial decisions based on inappropriate or immature science. If this
multidisciplinary effort were successful in establishing itself as a valued resource
and authority, the models it develops for assisting in the policy process could be
applied to other areas of science, technology, and law.
The proposal is not intended as a “thought experiment” or an academic
exercise. Failure to try such an approach will leave these matters to the
vagaries of the political process or to a court system that is unprepared to
address complex issues of science. The very structure of the court system
presses against the development of coherent and unified policies—courts
develop policies as legal challenges are presented, not from a proactive,
forward-looking approach. As a consequence, the results may impair scientists’
ability to conduct research and society’s ability to benefit from useful
technology. Moreover, the adoption of controversial, poorly understood, and
immature science by the courts or law enforcement could undermine public
confidence in the legal system, as well as unfairly affect the rights of citizens.
The initial political challenge facing such an effort will be to convince
policymakers in all branches of government that the analysis is timely and
relevant to them in governing. To achieve this goal, the analysis must be
capable of transcending narrow partisan and professional interests and should
therefore reach out to a broad range of stakeholders in a genuine dialogue
based on mutual respect for differences of opinion. Such a dialogue should help
to confer legitimacy on various policy options. It is not enough that the
dialogue be only among colleagues in a particular discipline, but it must also be
conducted across fields, so that both the participants and the larger group of
stakeholders may understand the wider context. Broad, integrative thinking
about what the sciences reveal to us about how we behave will help to shape
better policy—from statutes and regulations to courtrooms.
The ultimate challenge, however, is how to have a substantial and longlasting effect on policymaking.
The proposed effort must connect to
government but cannot be captured by it, or else it becomes just another
partisan battleground. So the question arises: How do you create a private
body to exert influence on the policymaking process without being part of the
government itself? The question of how best to assist policymakers with

malice and to bolster self-defense claim). Stamper has also been interpreted to bar admission of
psychiatric testimony that the defendant “lacked the capacity to form the necessary premeditation to
commit the offense of capital murder as charged in the indictment.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 389
S.E.2d 871, 879–80 (Va. 1990) (citing Stamper, 324 S.E.2d at 688).

05__GARLAND_FRANKEL.DOC

Winter/Spring 2006]

9/8/2006 3:50 PM

CONSIDERING CONVERGENCE: A POLICY DIALOGUE

113

questions that span multiple areas of expertise, like science and law, is
complicated. As the sheer volume of scientific knowledge has increased, it
seems clear that governmental and quasi-governmental bodies cannot by
themselves fully advise and educate policymakers on all of the scientific, legal,
and social issues associated with advances in science and technology. In short,
there are simply too many issues that would need to be addressed and too few
governmental bodies to meet that need.
Instead, the professional communities that have the relevant knowledge and
expertise to educate and inform policymakers should combine efforts to serve
as a non-governmental, non-partisan advisory body. This ongoing neuroscience
and law task force would monitor and assess future scientific developments as
they occur and report on these developments to policymakers and the public.
In addition to its ongoing deliberations, the task force could serve as “first
responder” to emerging events that could affect neuroscience research as well
as legal and policy decisions. In this latter capacity, the task force would
consider requests from scientists, legal professionals, and policymakers to
review and comment on issues of pressing importance and provide information
and guidance on these complex matters.
The impact of neuroscience and behavioral genetics on the criminal law
offers an opportunity to start such an effort on a small scale, by building on the
types of discussions that are included in this volume and in other relevant
proceedings. Without such an effort in place, the public policy dialogue will go
along in fits and starts—and our policies will be constantly playing “catch up” as
the science surges forward.

